On the potential of foreign aid to protect democracy against instability from trade by Kangoye, Thierry
On the potential of foreign aid to protect democracy
against instability from trade
Thierry Kangoye
To cite this version:
Thierry Kangoye. On the potential of foreign aid to protect democracy against instability from
trade. 2008.21. 2011. <halshs-00556697>
HAL Id: halshs-00556697
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00556697
Submitted on 17 Jan 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.21 
 
 
 
 
Document de travail de la série 
Etudes et Documents 
E 2008.21 
 
 
  
On the potential of foreign aid to protect democracy  
against instability from trade 
 
 
 
 
Thiery KANGOYE* 
 
CERDI-CNRS / Université d'Auvergne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2008 
37 p. 
 
 
 
 
*email address: thierryks@yahoo.fr 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
    In this paper, we examine the effects of a major source of instability, namely terms of 
trade instability on the quality of democracy, and we investigate whether foreign aid can 
dampen them. We take advantage of previous empirical findings explaining the role of 
aid in mitigating the adverse effects of external shocks, and argue that in the long term, 
aggregate aid flows can potentially dampen the effects of terms of trade instability on 
democracy. An empirical investigation with data from 71 developing countries over the 
period 1980-2003 provides supportive results. Moreover, the data suggest that terms of 
trade instability affects democracy through income instability.  
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1. Introduction  
The positive role of institutions on development has been widely assessed and confirmed; 
institutions cause fundamentally economic growth and development (North, 1990, Hall 
and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Rodrik and al., 2004). The 
obvious next question for some scholars has naturally been to know how countries 
acquire goods institutions. Rodrik (2000) has explained that countries face two strategies 
to optimise their institutions: copying well-functioning institutions from advanced 
countries (with a risk of failure, since the effectiveness of institutions is highly specific to 
local conditions), or taking advantage of local knowledge and engage in an 
experimentation process of institutional designs. But from another policy point of view, 
one can propose another formulation of strategies: still following Rodrik (2000), a first 
strategy could suggest that countries invest directly their resources in institutional 
improvement (through experimentation or copying from abroad) [which can be costly for 
their current economic performance], while a second strategy could suggest that instead 
of focusing directly on institutions, countries give preference to an indirect way of 
institutional building. They can do so by investing their resources on some determining 
factors of the emergence of good institutions, such as economic performance. As we will 
discuss in the next section, growth stability matters for institutional building and external 
assistance can be given a role, which is the purpose of this research. As a matter of fact, 
recent studies on aid effectiveness have highlighted macroeconomic instability as a factor 
of aid effectiveness. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004, 
2007), Collier and Dehn (2001) and Collier and Goderis (2007) have shown that aid, by 
protecting growth against the negative effects of shocks, is more effective in vulnerable 
countries. The core assumption of our paper is based on these findings and can be 
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formulated as follows: if one accepts that a stable growth is good for institutional 
building and that aid can make growth more stable by protecting it against shocks, one 
can therefore expect a positive effect of aid on institutions in countries exposed to these 
shocks. The question this research answers is important since reducing the adverse effects 
of macroeconomic instability as become a great challenge for developing countries. We 
focus in this research on democracy, as measured by synthetic indexes. As a matter of 
fact, democracy is considered as a meta institution which help to build better institutions, 
help societies to select good economic institutions from the available menu of them, and 
deliver higher-quality growth (more stable, better redistributed, more predictable) 
(Rodrik, 1997, 2000). Democracy has also gained importance with the worldwide 
diffusion of its ideology, which has induced a great deal of pressure for the 
underdeveloped world to adopt democratic forms of governments. We also focus in this 
research on terms of trade instability as a source of instability, since most of developing 
countries rely on the export sector of primary products and are dependent of world 
markets, making them particularly sensitive to terms of trade fluctuations. Moreover, the 
exogenous character of terms of trade fluctuations we can assume with the data we use1 
provides some technical benefits in the econometric estimations. We empirically test 
successfully that terms of trade instability is a source of income instability, which have 
negative effects on democracy, and that aid has a positive effect on the quality of 
democracy conditional on this instability. We explain that this is probably due to the 
‘growth stabilising’ effect of aid shown in previous studies. We use panel data from 71 
developing and emerging countries2 over the period 1980-2003 (pooled in two twelve-
years periods) and we find evidence that aid mitigates the adverse effects of term of trade 
                                                        
1 We discuss this argument in section 5.3 
 5 
instability on democracy. The effect of aid on institutions conditional on instability is 
assessed through an interactive variable equal to the product of aid and terms of trade 
instability. We also use instrumental variables to isolate the exogenous variation in aid 
flows. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses how terms of trade 
instability can lower democracy through income instability; section 3 briefly gives an 
overview of the debated institutional impacts of aid. Section 4 explains how aid may have 
a positive impact on democracy conditional on terms of trade instability. Section 5 
provides the empirical evaluation, and section 6 concludes. The appendix contains further 
information on the construction of the democracy indexes we use and the other variables.  
 
2. Why instability is detrimental for democracy? Some 
theoretical arguments  
Relatively few academic works deal explicitly with issues about causal relationships 
between macroeconomic instability (or its determining factors) and the quality of 
institutions. One interest of this paper is to explain how macroeconomic instability (more 
precisely terms of trade instability) can affect the quality of democracy. However, the 
well-known papers in the literature about macroeconomic instability and institutions has 
been interested in the reverse causation, that is the institutional causes of instability. 
Rodrik (1999) has explained that countries with weak institutions of conflicts 
management and where it exists latent social conflicts are more likely to experience 
severe external shocks. The core idea of his argumentation is that shocks (more precisely 
negative terms of trade shocks), by reducing wealthes to be redistributed, weaken growth 
stability because of redistribution conflicts when there are no rules to manage them. So, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 See the complete list in appendix 2 
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by concluding from this idea, good institutions of conflicts management (democratic 
institutions, rule of law, good social insurance system, and so forth.) can mitigate the 
impacts of shocks on growth. Acemoglu and al. (2003) have also explained that 
macroeconomic volatility is deeply determined by weak institutions rather than 
distortionary macroeconomic policies. Countries characterized by weak institutions are 
more likely to experience macroeconomic instability because of weak constraints on the 
executive (that favor bad resources redistribution and distortionary policies), lack of 
entrepreneur’s confidence (which causes investment instability), and weak security of 
contracts. Democratic institutions have also proved to have direct effects on 
macroeconomic stability, making that countries leaded by democratic regimes experience 
greater macroeconomic stability than non-democratic countries (Weede, 1996; Rodrik, 
1997; Quinn and Woolley, 2001; Almeida and Ferreira, 2002; Mobarak, 2005). Yang 
(2008) has also examined the causal relationship between democracy and growth 
volatility, and has shown that democratic institutions lower the volatility of real GDP per 
capita growth in ethnically divided countries.  
However, the reverse idea that is institutions can be affected by instability is also very 
important for policy implications, and concerns this research. We are interested in this 
paper in knowing how can terms of trade instability affect the quality of democracy. Our 
main theoretical reasoning is that a term of trade instability affects negatively democracy 
by generating income instability (Easterly and Kraay, 2000) and in turn, by lowering 
growth (Mobarak, 2005), which has been proved to be unfavourable to democratic 
processes. Academic works interested in the economic determinants of democracy have 
highlighted the level of development as one of the main determinants (Lipset, 1959, 
Helliwell, 1994). Nonetheless, while most of them have established a positive effect of 
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the level of growth on democracy, very few of them have discussed the quality of growth, 
and more specifically its stability (although the both can be closely related). We support 
the view that terms of trade instability causes (ceteris paribus) growth instability, which 
in turn, weaken democracy. As a matter of fact, growth instability can have an effect on 
the quality of democracy through (income) growth volatility in various ways. The first 
argument is that macroeconomic volatility is costly for growth and development, which 
are important determinants of democracy. Indeed, development, which is favourable to 
the emergence of good political institutions, requires sustained increases in income. The 
influencal work of Ramey and Ramey (1995)3 using a sample 92 countries has shown that 
countries with higher volatility have lower growth rates. But more interestingly, Mendoza 
(1997) has shown that volatility associated with terms of trade fluctuations could lead to 
slower growth (depending of the degree of risk aversion). Since we know that democratic 
institutions are evolving slowly and that their establishment and their reinforcement 
require financial resources (resources for organising democratic elections, resources to 
give means to civil society to be effective, resources for the establishment of an ecient 
parliament or an independent judicial court, etc.) to be taken from growth, income 
volatility which lower growth appears as a penalising factor of democracy.  
Instability from trade (proxied in this research by terms of trade instability) per se can 
also be harmful for democracy. High trade dependency (which increases countries 
exposure to external shocks) has been found to be unfavourable for the installation and 
consolidation of democratic regimes. As a matter of fact, terms of trade instability which 
can be seen as one of the symptoms of economic dependence and weak diversification, is 
a source of high exposure to fluctuations in world markets and economic instability, 
                                                        
3 Followed by many other studies 
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which penalize the stabilisation and legitimation of regimes (Huber, Rueschemeyer and 
Stephens, 1993). About this point, Djankov and al. (2008) have explained that negative 
shocks bring pressure on governments to reduce democracy and checks and balances.  
Income volatility (arising from terms of trade instability) can also have a negative effect 
on democratic institutions by generating uncertainty and risks on resources to be 
redistributed in an economy. On the one hand income instability can create some 
uncertainty in the politico-economic environment, which can in turn have a direct 
negative effect on the democratic process by changing the way of assuming power. On 
the other hand, this uncertainty can give some incitement to elites in power to exclude 
other competing political groups in order to maximise in the present, rent capture. So, 
elites can engage in rent-seeking activities in ‘good times’ (when income is high4) if their 
objective is to smooth their private consumption across time. As a consequence, this can 
result in a weak political competition and a therefore in a weak quality of democracy.   
 
Some stylized facts  
Our theoretical arguments predict a negative effect of instability on the quality of 
institutions (democracy). We have explained through literature how causalities between 
institutions and instability can run. We use in this section some statistical tools to assess 
the correlation between these two variables. Figures 1 confirms the expected negative 
correlation between terms of trade instability and the quality of democracy. As a matter 
of fact, after sorting countries by deciles regarding their indexes of terms of trade 
instability5, we show by using the institutional quality indexes of Freedom House and 
Polity IV that the most unstable countries are the ones which have the weakest 
                                                        
4 Since instability can be viewed as an alternation of positive and/or negative shocks 
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A. polit2 index 
B. Freedom H. index (inversely ranged) 
democratic institutions6. Table 2 also confirms this statistical evidence, by indicating a 
negative and significant correlation between terms of trade instability and the Freedom 
House democratic index. Though a correlation does not mean a causality, we predict a 
causal effect of instability on democracy, since in our opinion, one can assume an 
exogeneity of terms of trade instability. As a matter of fact, most of developing countries 
rely on their primary sectors exports and are price takers on the world markets. So, by 
using a variable of terms of trade instability, we exclude the assumption of the causal 
relationship from institutions to instability.  
 
 
Figure 1: The quality of institutions by deciles of instability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The existing literature on the effects of aid on institutions 
and democracy 
 
Disregarding any conditional effect of aid on the quality of institutions, several papers 
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 See section 5.2 for the calculation method of instability and appendix B for the sample countries 
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have examined the potential direct impact of aid on institutional development and have 
found different results about the nature of this impact, making them very debated. Many 
of them have focused on legal institutions (rule of law, corruption, bureaucracy, 
contracts, property rights), others on economic and political institutions, and have found 
that aid can have negative as well as positive effects on these institutions (see Svensson, 
2000; Goldsmith, 2001; Knack, 2001; Alesina and Weder, 2002; McNab and Everhart, 
2002; Hoffman, 2003; Tavares, 2003; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack and Rahaman, 
2004; IMF’s World Economic Outlook, 2005; Coviello and Islam, 2006). Regarding the 
specific effect of aid on democracy, the empirical findings in the literature seem to be less 
debated. The general view of the relationship between foreign aid and democracy is that 
one of aid’s purposes is to promote democracy in the developing world. Excepted the 
work of Djankov and al. (2008) which finds that aid has a negative effect on democracy, 
most of empirical papers conclude either to positive effects or simply to no effects. 
Djankov and al (2008) explain their findings by the fact that foreign aid could lead 
politicians in power to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to appropriate aid 
resources and to exclude other groups from the political process. This damages political 
institutions because they become in this way less representative and less democratic. The 
democracy-building efforts of aid donors potentially contribute to improve 
democratisation by improving the learning of electoral processes (through technical 
assistance and conditionalities), and by improving human resources quality and income 
level (Knack 2004). This point is confirmed by Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2005) who find 
strong evidence that political aid7 (electoral and technical assistance) directed to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 The Freedom House index is negatively ranged from 1 to 7. So the higher the index is the weaker is 
the quality of democracy 
7 The data they used is Government and Civil society Aid, provided by OECD 
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democratisation predict positively democratic transitions in recipient countries, when 
aggregate aid flows does not. While most of empirical studies on aid and democratisation 
have concluded to no effect of aid (Hoffman, 2003, Knack 2004, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, 
2005), some of them have found that aid could lead to better civil liberties, political 
competition and participation. Goldsmith (2001) supports this point by explaining that 
foreign aid, by improving health and literacy, make people more informed and aware of 
public politics, which improve the quality of democracy. Dunning (2004) demonstrates 
that foreign aid has a (small) positive effect on democracy in the post cold-War period. 
To sum up, the main empirical studies about the direct effect of aid on democratic 
institutions conclude that aid has no effect on them, or at most has a positive effect on 
democracy. But what effect of aid on institutions can be expected in some exogenous 
circumstances?  
 
4. What effect of aid on democracy conditional on exogenous 
factors? 
The aid effectiveness literature focusing on macroeconomic instability and economic 
vulnerability of recipient countries provide us with the general intuition of this research. 
Indeed if one accepts the point that aid has proved to be more effective in vulnerable 
countries by protecting growth against external shocks (by making it more stable), so aid 
could therefore have an indirect (positive) effect on institutions in these countries through 
this channel, since institutional development requires some stability in the economic 
environment. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004, 2007) 
have shown that negative terms of trade shocks have adverse effects on growth and that 
aid is more effective in vulnerable countries by making growth more stable in the 
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medium term. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2007) have discussed the stabilising character 
of aid regarding exports and more interestingly for this research, regarding growth 
volatility. They have explained that more than aid cyclicality (pro or counter), it’s the 
relative trend level of aid and its relative volatility compared to the flow of the interest 
(exports, national revenues, etc.), that contribute to explain its dampening character. 
Pointing out aid volatility as a factor of income volatility, their findings have concluded 
that the level of aid tends to dampen it. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Chauvet and 
Guillaumont (2004, 2007) have explained that in cases shocks occur, aid smoothes public 
expenditures and limit the risk of fiscal deficits. In recipient countries, national income 
and fiscal revenues are indeed more likely to be influenced by aid disbursements. The 
indicator of vulnerability they have used allow them to conclude that the level of aid is 
likely to cushion the negative effects of external shocks on economic growth8. Collier and 
Goderis (2007) have pursued this idea and have shown that the level of aid lower the 
negative effects of commodity export prices shocks on growth because aid finance 
precautionary expenditures, which reduce vulnerability to shocks. Elsewhere, Collier and 
Dehn (2001) have focused on export price shocks to explain aid effectiveness and have 
shown that while positive shocks have insignificant effects on the growth process, 
negative shocks reduce growth and the interaction between them and offseting increases 
of aid is significantly positive, meaning that aid mitigates the negative effects of terms of 
trade deterioration on growth. Easterly and Kraay (2000) have shown for small states that 
because of their greater openness, terms of trade shocks volatility is a source of growth 
instability. We can generalize this point to under developed countries since their are also 
                                                        
8 In Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), the indicator of vulnerability takes into account the size of 
population, the instability of exports agricultural production, while in Chauvet and Guillaumont 
(2004), it only takes into account exports instability and the negative trend of terms of trade. Since 
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highly dependent to trade and their exports are more specialised, making that when a 
trade shock occurs, their growth performances can be severely damaged. In previous 
sections, we have provided some arguments explaining that growth instability is not good 
for institutions partly because a stable growth allow quality institutions to emerge. We 
deduce from this point that all causes of stable growth are indirect causes of the 
emergence of good institutions. So, if aid reduces growth volatility, it can also protect 
institutions in situation of instability. To put things briefly, our main theoretical 
prediction is that aid, by mitigating the adverse effects of shocks on growth could have a 
positive conditional effect on democracy (ceteris paribus). The next sections provide an 
empirical evaluation of this prediction.  
 
5. Specifications, causalities and results  
5.1 The data  
We use data from 71 developing countries over the period 1980-2003. Aid data are from 
the World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance cd-rom (2005) 
(originally taken from OECD/DAC). Data on exports and imports of goods and services, 
Gross Development Product (measured in constant dollars of 2000 and in purchasing 
power parity) and population, have been also gotten from the same source. The Global 
Development Network Growth Database collected by William Easterly provides us with 
data on legal origin, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, geography and infant mortality. 
We focus in this paper on political institutions, and more precisely on democratic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(exogeneous) terms of trade instability is also a source of vulnerability (which causes a risk on 
growth), the growth-stabilisation eﬀect of aid can also be valid for this type of instability. 
 14 
institutions. So, we use two synthetic democratic indicators from the Polity IV project 
database and the Freedom House database (See appendix 1 for a complete description of 
these indicators). Data on terms of trade are from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics.  
 
5.2 The measure of instability  
Our terms of trade instability variable measures the gap between the terms of trade and an 
estimated trend of terms of trade. Instability is indeed always measured over a reference, 
which is often an estimated trend. This requires making some assumptions about the 
nature of this trend. As a matter of fact, estimations can give wrong results if a 
deterministic trend is estimated with a non-stationary variable. Because most of economic 
variables include a trend, which is not purely stochastic, we assume the trend in terms of 
trade to be mixed (both deterministic and stochastic). Then, we get the predicted value of 
terms of trade ( ˆ X ) by running the following regression (equation 3) on 12-year periods9 
(i refers to countries, t refers to years. X is the terms of trade variable and εit  is the 
idiosyncratic error term):  
 
X it = α + βX i( t−1) + γt + εit        (1) 
 
 
Afterwards, we compute for each period, an instability index by using the following 
formula (quadratic mean):  
 
Instabit =100.
1
T
( X i −
ˆ X 
ˆ X 
)2
i= t1
t2
∑       (2) 
 
                                                        
9 We also considerer 12-year trends 
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where T = t2 − t1is the lenght of periods p.  
 
 
5.3 The econometric model and the identification strategy  
Our econometric model includes as main controls10, net aggregate Ocial Development 
Assistance, terms of trade instability, and an interaction term equal to the product of aid 
and terms of trade instability. This later variable allows us to test the dampening effect of 
aid. We write the baseline model as follows:  
 
Democ it = α i + βIit + γAit + κAit × Iit + ωX it + ν it       (3) 
 
 
where Democ it is an index of democracy, Ait  is the aid variable, Iit  is terms of trade 
instability and Ait × Iit  is the interaction term between aid and terms of trade instability. 
α i is country fixed effects which are included to capture time-invariant country 
characteristics. X it  is a vector of controls including geography, education, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation, initial conditions, estimated settler mortality rate, life expectancy, and 
an african dummy variable11 . i and t stand respectively for countries and time periods. 
Democracy in a country is indeed a function of many factors. Ethnic diversity (proxied by 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation) is often assumed to have an effect on political freedom 
and political competition, since democracy is less likely to prevail in countries which are 
socially divided and which lack cultural and linguistic coherence (Lijphart, 1977, 
Horowitz, 1993). Socioeconomic development (that we proxied by the purchasing power 
parity estimate of income per capita, and education) has long been believed to be 
conducive to the emergence or survival of democracy. Democracy can also be explained 
                                                        
10 See appendix for a more detailed description and deﬁnition of the data 
11 Appendix give a precise description of all of these variables 
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by geographical characteristics which are a good control for climatic conditions and 
contagion effects, and which may predict political regime classification. Initial economic 
conditions (proxied by initial level of per capita income) also matter for democracy, since 
they are assumed to determine the initial quality of democracy (and therefore current, 
because of the persistence of institutions). So, we anticipate positive estimated 
coecients of the interaction term, geography, education, and negative coecients of 
instability, and fractionalisation. Since we focus on long-run effects of aid and instability, 
and because democratisation is a long-term process, we average our variables on twelve-
year periods (1980-1991 and 1992-2003). 
  
Potential endogeneity problems and treatment  
It is often argued that aid and democracy are endogenously related, since countries which 
make progress in their democratisation process are able to attract more aid 
(‘conditionality’ argument), as some donors reward recipients with better democratic 
performances with more aid. The econometric estimation of such a model facing reverse 
causality between aid and institutions requires dealing rightly with endogeneity. As 
demonstrated by Wooldridge (2006) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of such a 
model produce biased and inconsistent estimators. Although in principle, the endogeneity 
problem can be avoided by applying instrumental variable techniques, the fundamental 
problem is that there are no ideal instruments available. A good instrument in this case 
would be a variable, which is highly correlated with aid but not with the error term in the 
regression. Nevertheless, we have tried to control for the aid endogeneity problem by 
using as excluded instruments, the amount of ocial development assistance and grants 
of the five main donors (identified each year), weighted by the distance between the 
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donor and the recipient. So, following Brun, Chambas and Guerineau (2005), we create 
instrumental variables for aid à la Tavares (2003), which should be correlated with the 
level of foreign aid received by a country while being exogenous to the level of 
democracy in this country. For each recipient country and each year, the five main aid 
donors are identified (with dummies variables). The total amount of aid is then weighted 
by the geographical proximity (proxied by the inverse of bilateral distance) of the 
recipient country with Washington (for Canada and United States), Brussels (for 
european donor countries), Tokyo (for Japan) and Canberra (for Australia and New 
Zealand). As explained by Tavares (2003), the reasoning is that, when a donor country 
increases its total aid outflows, recipient countries that are closer to that donor experience 
an exogenous increase in aid inflows. The overidentification tests and statistics confirms 
the quality of these two variables as instruments for aid. 
We assume terms of trade instability to be exogenous12; as a matter of fact, most of 
developing countries rely on their primary sectors exports and are price takers on the 
world markets. Moreover, the principal international markets for developing countries 
exports are the advanced industrial countries on which developing countries also rely 
regarding their imports. Thus, terms of trade shifts should be determined exogenously. 
Finally, we use the predicted value (exogenous component) of aid from the first-stage 
regression to compute the interactive variable between aid and terms of trade instability 
to get the real exogenous value of it. So, the econometric model we estimate can be 
written as follows: 
 
Democ it = α i + βIit + γ ˆ A it + κ ˆ A it × Iit + ωX it + εit    (4) 
 
                                                        
12 Unfortunately, it remains diﬃcult to test the exogeneity of this variable, because of the availability 
of good instrumental variables. 
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where ˆ A it  is the predicted value of aid from the first-stage regression. Democ it , Iit , X it  
keep the same meaning as in equation (1). εit  is the error term. 
 
5.4 Findings  
Table 3 presents the main results13
 
. In columns (1), (2) and (3), the dependant variable is 
the quality of democracy, measured by the polity2 combined index of democracy and 
autocracy. All of our estimations include country fixed effects to take into account 
country-specific heterogeneity. The aid variable is aid per capita in the three 
specifications. Column (1) is the baseline specification and includes as controls, 
geography, education, ethnolinguistic fractionnalisation, and initial income. According to 
the findings of previous studies, the effect of aid on democracy is not significantly 
different from 0, even if the coecient is negative. Unsurprisingly, an increase in terms 
of trade instability seems to be associated with a significant decline in democracy, which 
confirms our theoretical expectations. But since both the coecients of terms of trade 
instability and the multiplicative variables are significant, the marginal effect of terms of 
trade instability on democracy must be interpretated with caution. As demonstrated by 
Wooldridge (2006), this marginal effect depends on aid values, and equals 
∂Democ
∂Instab = α + βAid , where α  is the estimated coecient of terms of trade instability and 
β  is the one of the interaction variable. From our main findings, 
∂Democ
∂Instab = −0.51+ 0.005Aid . This mean that at the sample mean value of aid (per capita), 
which is 54.82, the marginal effect of terms of trade instability on the quality of 
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democracy is always negative, and is about −0.51+ 0.005(54.82) = −0.24. 
More interestingly, we find that aid dampens the effect of instability on democracy. This 
effect is showed by the positive and significant coecient of the interactive variable, 
explaining that as instability increases, the effect of aid on the quality of democracy 
becomes positive. This coecient is however small and about .005. Among the control 
variables, education is the most powerful predictor of democracy. As expected, its 
coecient is positive and significant. Geography and initial income are not significant. 
Only ethnolinguistic fractionalisation has not the expected sign, and is significantly 
different from 0. In columns (2) and (3), we successively include in the regression for 
robustness, other possible determinants of democracy that are the estimated mortality of 
european settler, the initial income and a dummy variable for african countries. This 
african dummy controls for group specific effects; life expectancy allows a better control 
for socioeconomic development, and settler mortality control for historical conditions. As 
a matter of fact, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) have explained that the 
different environments (from the viewpoint of their hospitality) faced by european 
colonists, have fundamentally influenced the types of long-lasting institutions they 
created. We find that these specifications does not change the main findings, and that the 
coecients of interest are stable. Aid remains not significantly related to democracy; 
increase in instability still leads to a decrease of democracy, and aid has still a dampening 
effect. In column (3), except settler mortality which has not the expected sign (but is 
however weakly significant), all others significant variables have the right sign: 
geography, education, and initial income predict positively democracy, while having a 
high fractionalisation index and being an african countries predict negatively democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
13 Regarding the number of countries we basically consider, the number of observations seems to be 
 20 
The Hansen overidentification test confirms the quality of instrumental variables for aid, 
since all associated p-values are above 10%. Columns (1) and (2) of table 4 attemp to 
explain the dampening effect of aid according to our theoretical expectations, that is 
terms of trade instability is a source of income instability and aid dampens the negative 
effect of the primer because it makes growth more stable. In column (1), we test the 
direct effect of terms of trade instability on democracy, with the same set of control 
variables, and we confirm its negative effects. In column (2), we include in the 
regression, income instability14. As expected, while the effects of terms of trade 
instability remains negative and far from significativity, the coecient of income 
instability variable, which is about -2.95, is negative and significantly different from 0. 
And because we suspect income instability to be endogenous to democracy (since it may 
depend of many internal factors correlated with the quality of democracy), we instrument 
it. As a matter of fact, Rodrik (1997) has shown that democracies produce greater 
stability in economic performance. So, to deal with this potential endogeneity, we use as 
instrumental variable for income instability, foreign direct investments (henceforth FDI) 
instability. The amount of FDI is indeed a strong predictor of the level of development 
and income, and is not obviously related to democracy. The Hansen overindentification 
test confirms the quality of this instrumentation, since the associated p-value is about 
0.19. Among the control variables, except life expectancy, all of them have the expected 
sign, even if only geography and settler mortality are significantly different from 0. This 
result shows that income instability is a valid transmission channel of the effect of terms 
of trade instability on democracy. To come back to our question of interest, if the 
negative effect of terms of trade instability on democracy is channeled through income 
                                                                                                                                                                     
somewhat small; this is due to gaps in some important variables we control for in regressions. 
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instability, so, aid may have a dampening effect, since some authors have shown that it 
makes income growth more stable. Finally, we have tested the robustness of our main 
results regarding the use of another democracy index (the Freedom House index of 
democracy15), the use of another measure of aid intensity (net ocial development 
assistance over GDP), and the use of different temporal periods (8-years periods). Our 
main results, which are summarised in columns (1), (2) and (3) of table 3, stand. Except 
geography and settler mortality which have not the expected sign, terms of trade 
instability remains detrimental for the quality of democracy and aid remains stabilising, 
while having no direct effect on democracy. 
 
 
Table 1: Main results (with aid per capita)  
 
 Dependent variable: democracy (polity2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Aid -.07(-1.31) -.0718(-1.31) -.07(-1.32) 
Terms of trade instab. -.51***(-2.54) -.512***(-2.54) -.51**(-2.44) 
Aid×instability .005**(2.00) .005**(2.00) .005**(1.99) 
Geography -.02(-0.48) .13(1.28) .348***(3.27) 
Education .25***(3.23) .25***(3.23) .25***(3.13) 
Eth. Fractionalisation .12***(6.16) .08*(1.77) -.07***(-2.46) 
Initial income 1.10(0.30) 1.77(0.50) 2.49(0.68) 
Settler mortality  .24(0.17) 4.03*(1.88) 
Life expectancy   -.0002(-0.00) 
Africa   -13.8***(-4.45) 
Countries fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.86 0.86 0.87 
Obs 88 88 88 
Overidentification test for aid instruments 
Hansen J stat. 2.34 0.36 1.82 
p-value 0.12 0.54 0.17 
Notes: significativity thresholds: (***:1%), (**:5%), (*:10%). Heteroskedasticity 
robust z-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
14 computed with the same methodology used for the calculation of terms of trade instability 
15 As illustrated by ﬁgure 2 in apendix , the polity2 and the Freedom House indexes are in close 
agreement over the period 1977-2003. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
Aid does neither promote nor undermine democratic processes, but have a indirect 
positive effect on democracy in the long term by dampening the adverse effects of terms 
of trade instability. While the debate about how external assistance could improve 
political institutions is still ongoing, this study finds that aggregate aid flows mitigate 
instability from trade and protect democracy, and this is probably because aid makes 
growth more stable, as shown by some recent studies (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001, 
2004, Chauvet and Guilaumont, 2007, Collier and Goderis, 2007). We have also shown 
that terms of trade instability is a source of income instability which have a negative 
effect on democracy. So, to come back to the development strategies we proposed in 
introduction, the message of this study is that foreign aid can be useful in promoting 
institutions through their determinants. However, in a context of a debate about how to 
significantly increase aid in developing countries to reach the Millennium Development 
Goals by 2015, the findings from this study must not be interpreted as a calling for a big 
push of aid. As a matter of fact, even if democracy is considered as a meta institution, 
others types of institutions (legal and economic institutions) also matter for growth and 
development, and numerous studies have shown that they can be severely damaged as a 
result of large amounts of aid.  
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APPENDIX A: Description of democracy indicators from Freedom 
House and Polity IV  
 
A. The Freedom House democratic index  
 
The Freedom House index focuses on two aspects of democracy, which are political rights and 
civil liberties. The methodology of assessing democracy consists in ranking each country 
regarding these two aspects, from 1 (worse democratic situation) to 7 (best democratic situation). 
Evaluations are made on the basis of the answers to a questionnaire submitted to actors from civil 
society, political world and the media, which are mostly non-governmental organizations or press. 
Next, the synthetic index is computed by averaging the index of political rights (proxied through 
the election mode of the chief of executive and the existence of an electoral framework) and the 
index of civil liberties (proxied through the freedom of opinion, the freedom of believes, the 
freedom of association, the legitimate state and human rights, the autonomy of people and the 
economic rights). The questionnaire is made of eight questions about political rights and fourteen 
questions about civil liberties; the scale of each question goes negatively from 1 to 4. Finally, 
depending of the total score, the two indexes are given a note between 1 and 7.  
 
 
B. The Polity IV democratic index (polity2)  
 
The Polity IV project from the University of Maryland provides a database about several 
indicators of democracy (executive constraints, political participation, openness in recruitment, 
etc.). The polity2 index is computed by summing an index of democracy (DEMOC), which is 
positively scaled from 0 to 10, and an index of autocracy (AUTOC), which is positively scaled 
from -10 to 0. The (DEMOC) index of democracy assesses democracy on the basis of four 
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criteria: competition in political participation, competition and openness in the executive 
recruitment, and institutional constraints on the executive power. For instance, to assess openness 
in executive recruitment, assessors will ask whether all people can potentially access to the power 
if elections are free, or whether the power are hereditary. For instance, in order to assess 
executive constraints, assessors will be interested in the existence of a legislative power or a 
constitutional strength. These informations are used to give a ranking for each variable. So, 
political participation will be coded by 3 in cases of competitive situations, by 2 in cases of 
transitional situations, and by 1 in cases of factional situations. The total score of these different 
components of democracy will be the score for DEMOC variable. The AUTOC index of 
autocracy, which assesses political competition, and respect for political liberties is computed 
with the same methodology. Thus, situations of repressed competitiveness of participation will be 
coded by -2, and situations of suppressed competitiveness of participation will be coded by -1. 
The scale for the DEMOC variable goes positively form -10 to 0. In the end, the polity2 synthetic 
variable is obtained by summing the two indexes and by normalizing situations that assessors 
have considered as impossible to assess like periods of political transitions.  
 
APPENDIX B: data description  
 
Aid per capita16
 
= Net aggregate ocial development assistance transfers (2004 $US millions) 
per capita (Source: author’s calculations from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) online 
database and World Development Indicators, 2005). 
Aid%GDP
1 
= Net aggregate ocial development assistance transfers (2004 $US millions) as 
share of gross domestic product (Source: author’s calculations from Development Assistance 
                                                        
16 Aid includes grants and concessionary loans with a grant element of more than 25%. Military 
assistance is excluded. 
 31 
Committee (DAC) online database and World Development Indicators, 2005). 
Polity2 index = Combined democracy and autocracy score, ranged from -10(full autocracy) to 
+10(full democracy). (Source: Polity IV project). 
Freedom House index = Democracy index, ranged from 1(best democratic situation) to 
+7(worse situation). (Source: Freedom House). 
Terms of trade instability = Net barter terms of trade instability (see section 5.2 for the 
calculation method). (Source: author’s calculation). 
Income instability = instability of GDP per capita (2000 US $), computed with the calculation 
method described in section 5.2 (Source: author’s calculation). 
Geography = Distance from equator of capital city measured as abs (latitude)/90. (Source: World 
Bank (2002)). 
Education = Literacy rate, adult total (% of people 15+). (Source: World Development 
Indicators, 2005). 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation= Probability that two persons randomly selected in the 
population don’t belong to the same ethnic group. (Source: Atlas Narodov Mira). 
Settler mortality = Natural logarithm of estimated european settlers’ mortality rate. (Source: 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)). 
Life expectancy = Life expectancy at birth, for total population (years). (Source: World 
Development Indicators, 2005). 
Africa = Dummy variable taking value 1 if a country belongs to Africa, 0 otherwise. (Source: 
author). 
Initial income = Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980 (2000 US dollars and PPP). 
(Source: World Development Indicators, 2005). 
Income growth = Natural logarithm of GDP per capita growth (2000 US dollars and PPP). 
(Source: World Development Indicators, 2005).  
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Base countries sample (71 countries -African countries in bold characters)  
 
Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Colombia, Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Ivory 
Coast, Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao 
PDR, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 A. Aid variables 
Net ODA per capita (US $) 204 54.82 71.29 -2.40 485.52 
Net ODA as percent. of GDP (%) 198 .106  .139 -.0002 .89 
 B. Institutional measures 
Polity2 index 203 -.86  6.41 -10 10 
Freedom House index 204 4.61  1.59 7 1 
 C. Terms of trade 
Net barter terms of trade 150 113.37 42.39 26.25 397.54 
Terms of trade instability (12-years 
trend) 
150 9.53 9.33  7.63e-06 90.22 
 D. Countries characteristics 
Geography 204 16.84 10.92  0 39 
Education 168 66.04 22.46 9.81 97.87 
Eth. Fractionalisation 166 47.62  29.10 0 93 
Settler mortality 138 4.90  1.06 2.43 7.98 
Life expectancy  203  59.11  11.21 35.80 77.95 
Africa 204  0.45  0.49 0 1 
Initial income 174 2677.96 5898.56 126.35  46473.4 
Income growth 193  0.88 0.65 -0.93 3.37 
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Table 3: Pairwise correlation matrix  
 
 Aid per 
cap. 
Aid%GDP Polity2 Fr. 
House 
tot ins. Income ins. 
Aid per cap. 1.00      
Aid%GDP 0.41* 1.00     
Polity2 -0.07 -0.22* 1.00    
Fr. House 0.02 -0.27* 0.88* 1.00   
tot ins. -0.07 0.06 -0.13 -0.17* 1.00  
Income ins. 0.09 0.13 -0.18* -0.19* 0.19* 1.00 
Note:(*) 5 percent level significativity. Terms of trade instability and income instability are 
computed with 12-years trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Correlation between Freedom House and Polity IV democratic indexes  
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APPENDIX C: Findings  
 
Table 4: Democracy, term of trade and income instability 
 
 Dependent var.: democracy (polity2) 
 (1) (2) 
Income instab. - -2.95***(-2.61) 
Terms of trade instab. -0.18***(-2.59) -0.03(-0.33) 
Geography -0.61(-0.13) -0.36***(-5.08) 
Eth. Fractionalisation -1.05(-0.55) -0.02(-0.50) 
Log(trade) 1.35(1.02) 0.30(0.17) 
Settler mortality -69.41(-0.36) -7.75***(-2.90) 
Education 0.25***(5.96) -0.04(-0.62) 
Life expectancy -0.03(-0.33) -0.51***(-2.74) 
Initial income 16.64***(3.91) 1.44(0.89) 
Countries fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2 0.81 0.86 
Obs 128 126 
Overidentification test for aid instruments 
Hansen J stat. - 1.74 
p-value - 0.19 
Notes: significativity thresholds: (***:1%), (**:5%), (*:10%). Heteroskedasticity 
robust z-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 5: Robustness checks 
 
 
 Dependent variable: democracy  
 Freedom House aid%gdp 8-years periods 
Aid -.027(-1.56) -.099(-1.50) -.061(-1.42) 
Terms of trade instab. -.18***(-2.97) -.184***(-3.39) -.054***(-2.74) 
Aid×instability .0016***(2.38) .007***(2.90) .003*(1.86) 
Geography .062*(1.86) .028***(2.18) .068***(2.34)  
Education .02(0.99) .027(1.37) .024(1.48) 
Eth. Fractionalisation .003(0.33) -.013(-1.12) .012(1.43) 
Initial income .84(0.94) .94(1.02) 1.45**(2.09) 
Settler mortality .41(0.72) .77***(2.43) .74(2.04) 
Life expectancy -.05(-0.85) -.09(-1.43) -.01(-0.37) 
Africa -1.94**(-2.12) -2.12***(-3.20) -.63(-0.92) 
Countries fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.82 
Obs 88 88 131 
Overidentification test for aid instruments 
Hansen J stat. 0.397 0.57 0.56 
p-value 0.52 0.44 0.45 
Notes: significativity thresholds: (***:1%), (**:5%), (*:10%). Heteroskedasticity robust z-
statistics in parentheses 
 
